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A CRIMINAL LAW WE CAN CALL OUR OWN? 
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ABSTRACT—This Essay sketches an ideal of criminal law—of the kind of 
criminal law that we can call our own as citizens of a democratic republic. 
The elements of that ideal include a republican theory of liberal democracy, 
as the kind of polity in which we can aspire to live; an account of the role 
of criminal law in such a polity, as defining a set of public wrongs and 
providing an appropriate formal, public response to the commission of such 
wrongs through the criminal process of trial and punishment; and a 
discussion of how the citizens of such a polity will relate to their criminal 
law and of the various active roles that they will be ready to play in the 
law’s enterprise. This account does not aim to describe, or to justify, our 
existing systems of criminal law. Instead, it offers a normative ideal against 
which we can judge our existing institutions, and towards which we can 
strive to reform them. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What follows is a sketch of an ideal of criminal law—criminal law 
understood not as an abstract body of doctrine, but as a set of institutions 
and practices focused on the definition of crimes and the detection, 
prosecution, and punishment of those who commit them. This, I will argue, 
is the kind of criminal law that we ought to aspire to achieve: a criminal 
law that we can call, and treat as, our own as citizens of a democratic 
republic. The aim is not to describe or justify the criminal law we actually 
have, but rather to provide a model of what criminal law ought to be. That 
model can then serve both as a focus for our reformative aspirations and as 
a basis on which to identify and critique the manifold deficiencies and 
injustices of our existing systems.1 
Any normative theory of criminal law depends on a political theory. 
Criminal law is part of the political structure of a society: if we are to 
understand what criminal law should be or what it should do (what aims or 
functions it should serve), we must have some idea of the kind of polity in 
which it is to operate, of the guiding aims and values of such a polity, and 
of how a system of criminal law can serve those aims and embody those 
values. Part I sketches the kind of political theory on which I rely—a 
republican theory of a liberal democracy. Part II discusses the role of 
criminal law in such a polity, and Part III then deals with the ways in which 
the citizens of such a polity will relate to their criminal law. Given 
constraints of space, I cannot argue for this political theory here, and will 
only be able to sketch the conception of criminal law that it can ground;2 
but I hope to be able to say enough to show that it is a conception that is 
worth taking seriously as an ideal. 
1 These deficiencies and injustices have been thoroughly documented in recent scholarly writings. 
For two useful starting points, American and English, see WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011) and Andrew Ashworth, Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?, 
116 LAW Q. REV. 225 (2000).
2 For more developed arguments, see R A DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME: RESPONSIBILITY AND
LIABILITY IN CRIMINAL LAW (2007); R A DUFF, THE REALM OF CRIMINAL LAW (forthcoming 2018); 
and R A Duff, Towards a Modest Legal Moralism, 8 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 217 (2014).
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I. A LIBERAL REPUBLIC
Like any long-established tradition of political thought, republicanism 
comes in many forms.3 For present purposes, we can say simply that a 
liberal republic is a polity of free and equal citizens who recognize each 
other as fellow members of a political community. They owe each other 
“equal concern and respect”: equal concern that they should have the 
resources needed to pursue their distinctive conceptions of the good; equal 
respect for their freedom, their rights, and their privacy.4 They will have a 
robust conception of the res publica: of the aims and values by which their 
shared life as citizens—the polity’s public realm—is structured; though 
they will often differ about the proper interpretation or application of those 
aims and values, they are able to work through these differences in an 
ongoing process of public deliberation. 
That res publica can also be described as the polity’s “civil order.” It 
consists of a structure of institutions, practices, shared expectations, and 
norms concerning our civic interactions, which together help define the 
polity as a political community.5 These include the various institutions of 
government and law, but also the wider range of institutions that we 
recognize as public, together with all those shared social practices and 
norms that embody our understanding of what we owe to each other—
down to such matters as how we behave in the street and conventions such 
as queuing. Law, including criminal law, helps both to structure and to 
sustain this civil order: it helps both to determine the shape and content of 
our civil order, and to protect it against different kinds of damage or threat.6 
I will return to this below, in relation to criminal law, but we must first note 
another crucial aspect of the civil order of a liberal polity. 
Because it is a liberal polity, its citizens share a commitment to such 
liberal values as freedom, pluralism, and privacy. Of particular importance 
here is the relationship between these values. Freedom includes, crucially, 
the freedom to pursue our own conceptions of the good: a liberal polity 
does not just tolerate but also welcomes and fosters a plurality of ways of 
3 For a useful overview, see Frank Lovett, Republicanism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., rev. ed. 2014), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/
republicanism/ [https://perma.cc/9FWG-H3HE].
4 On equal concern and respect, see RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 190 (1985), 
which concerned only what a state owes its citizens, but we can describe what liberal citizens owe each 
other in the same terms. On republican freedom, see PHILIP PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS: A 
REPUBLICAN THEORY AND MODEL OF DEMOCRACY (2012).
5 See LINDSAY FARMER, MAKING THE MODERN CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMINALIZATION AND CIVIL
ORDER (2016) (especially Chapter 2); see also NEIL MACCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS OF LAW: AN ESSAY 
IN LEGAL THEORY (2007) (especially Chapter 12 on “civil peace”).
6 See generally FARMER, supra note 5.
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life, of conceptions of the good life.7 This requires us to draw a firm 
distinction, or a firm set of distinctions, between the “public” and the 
“private.” The public realm is the civic realm in which we live together and 
interact as citizens; it is the realm of matters that compose our collective 
business as citizens. But in a liberal polity, this realm is limited, because 
“citizen” is only one among other roles that we play. For most of us, other 
roles are more important in terms of their significance in, and contribution 
to, what we take to be a good life. We find our most important goods and 
goals not in our civic lives but in a range of more particular, often more 
personal, activities and relationships—for instance, our families, our 
friendships, or our membership in charitable, work-related, and leisure-
related associations. These are, as far as the polity is concerned, private 
realms, in the sense that our conduct within them is not the business of our 
fellow citizens as such, or of the polity as a whole.8 More precisely, the 
civil order makes room for these private realms: it makes it possible for us 
to form and sustain such noncivic associations. It also defines the limits and 
constraints within which they can operate. Most obviously, the criminal 
law defines limits on how we may behave towards each other in our private 
lives as much as in our public lives: murder, wounding, and assault are just 
as much crimes when committed against a spouse as when committed 
against a stranger.9 Within those limits, however, what we do in our private 
lives is not the business of the polity.  
These distinctions between public and private are often controversial. 
To mention just a few recent examples, there is controversy about whether 
all consensual sexual conduct should be seen as a private matter, or 
whether the polity has the right to pass judgment on such conduct and to 
bring it within the reach of the criminal law.10 The history of legislation 
concerning various kinds of discrimination is also in part the history of 
debates about the scope of the public realm. Should decisions about whom 
I employ, whom I serve in my shop or restaurant, or whom I rent my hotel 
7 See, e.g., RICHARD BELLAMY, LIBERALISM AND PLURALISM: TOWARDS A POLITICS OF
COMPROMISE (1999).
8 On the “public” and the “private” see further Christine Sypnowich, The Civility of Law: Between 
Public and Private, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE: LEGAL, POLITICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 93 
(Maurizio Passerin d’Entrèves & Ursula Vogel eds., 2000).
9 This is something that was only slowly recognized in the case of domestic violence, which was 
often dismissed by the police as a private matter into which they should not or need not intervene. This 
example shows the importance, and the difficulty, of the distinction between the public and the private. 
On mala in se, see infra note 18.
10 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (consensual homosexual conduct); R v. Brown 
(Anthony Joseph) [1994] 1 A.C. (H.L.) 212 (consensual sado-masochism). Also relevant here is the 
question of whether evidence of a rape complainant’s prior sexual conduct should ever be admissible at 
trial. See FED. R. EVID. 412; R v. Evans [2016] EWCA (Crim) 452 (Wales). 
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rooms to be seen as private matters; or should they be subjected to public 
rules that prohibit certain kinds of discriminatory choices?11 Such 
controversies must be worked out through a process of public deliberation, 
and different polities will resolve them in different ways; but an important 
point to note here is that the controversies are not just, or even initially, 
about whether the conduct in question is morally right or wrong. The first 
and primary question to be resolved is whether it is a public matter at all—
whether it is the polity’s business: only if it is in that sense a public matter 
does it become necessary and appropriate to discuss whether it is wrong. 
Someone could with complete consistency believe (as some people indeed 
do believe) that abortion is morally wrong—except under very limited 
circumstances—even within the first weeks of pregnancy, but also believe 
that it should not be criminalized because it is a private, rather than a 
public, matter.12 
We should note one further feature of a liberal republic understood as 
a political community of citizens. Communities can be inclusionary or 
exclusionary in spirit. They can, that is, be ready to welcome new members 
and be very reluctant to exclude or expel existing members; or they can 
make citizenship difficult to acquire and be quick to expel existing 
members who violate their values. One depressing feature of our existing 
polities is that they tend too often to be exclusionary in both these ways: we 
are reluctant to admit, let alone welcome, new members (as our responses 
to refugees from war-torn parts of the world make all too clear), and we are 
all too ready to portray and to treat those who violate our criminal laws as 
outsiders who have forfeited their status as citizens—to exclude them from 
our shared civic life. Our enthusiasm to disenfranchise those serving prison 
sentences, during and even after their punishment, gives vivid expression to 
this kind of exclusion, as does the wide range of further “collateral 
consequences” to which those convicted of criminal offences are liable.13 
But we should aspire to a more inclusionary spirit. First, although we may 
resist a cosmopolitanism that denies any fundamental significance to 
national citizenship,14 we can be welcoming rather than hostile towards 
11 For a nice example, see Hall v. Bull [2013] UKSC 73, which considered whether it constitutes 
unlawful discrimination for a hotel keeper to refuse, on religious grounds, to let a double room to a 
same-sex couple.
12 Note that in the landmark case of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
argument about the constitutionality of legal prohibitions on abortion was based primarily on the issue 
of privacy. 
13 See generally MARGARET COLGATE LOVE ET AL., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL 
CONVICTIONS (2013).
14 For a useful survey of cosmopolitan arguments, see Pauline Kleingeld & Eric Brown, 
Cosmopolitanism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., rev. ed. 2014), 
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fellow human beings who seek to become our fellow citizens.15 Second, we 
can and should be slow to exclude fellow citizens from the polity. I have no 
demonstrative argument to offer for these claims: what underpins them is, 
rather, an appeal to an idea(l) of solidarity—to a recognition of each other 
as fallible fellow beings to whose well-being membership of a polity is 
crucially important.16 
Our next question concerns the role of law, and in particular of 
criminal law, in a republican polity of this kind. 
II. A LIBERAL REPUBLIC’S CRIMINAL LAW
What are the distinguishing features of criminal law, as a distinctive 
mode of law? There are, I think, two such features, which give it a 
distinctive place in a polity’s civil order: both reflect the way in which the 
criminal law is essentially concerned with public wrongs—with, that is, 
morally wrongful conduct that falls within the public sphere. 
First, the substantive criminal law defines a range of offenses. In 
doing so, it defines a set of public wrongs—kinds of conduct that are to be 
formally and publicly condemned as wrong.17 Although the substantive 
criminal law is often described as a set of prohibitions—that is, 
prohibitions on the kinds of conduct it defines as “criminal”—this is 
misleading, because it implies that the law’s purpose is to issue commands 
or orders that the citizens are to obey; and that in thus prohibiting conduct 
the law claims the power to make wrongful conduct that was not or might 
not have been already wrongful. The criminal law does not claim any such 
power or authority. Rather, it claims the authority to declare certain 
preexisting wrongs (wrongs, that is, which exist and can be understood as 
wrong independently of the criminal law) to be public wrongs that formally 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/cosmopolitanism/ [https://perma.cc/GN7Q-DX8E]. 
For an extended argument against outright cosmopolitanism, see DAVID MILLER, CITIZENSHIP AND 
NATIONAL IDENTITY (2000). 
15 See, for instance, the aspiration expressed in the Preamble to the Constitution of the Argentine 
Nation: “con el objeto de . . . asegurar los beneficios de la libertad, para nosotros, para nuestra 
posteridad, y para todos los hombres del mundo que quieran habitar en el suelo argentino” (“in order 
to . . . secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves, to our posterity, and to all men of the world who wish 
to dwell on argentine soil”). Pmbl., CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.). 
16 Compare the “right to a nationality” declared in Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 15 (Dec. 10, 1948), 
http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ [https://perma.cc/F998-MF4H]. I should note 
that whatever account of citizenship we give, a polity’s criminal law will still have to deal with some, 
perhaps many, who are not citizens: to allay well-founded fears that a focus on citizenship might 
disadvantage them, we should emphasize the importance of the normative category of guest, and of the 
rights and responsibilities of hospitality. 
17 The substantive criminal law also, of course, defines the range of defenses through which one 
who commits an offense can avoid conviction.
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concern the whole polity and to provide, when necessary, authoritative 
definitions of those wrongs as criminal wrongs. 
This declaratory authority is most clearly seen in the case of so-called 
mala in se: crimes consisting in conduct that is (the law claims) wrongful 
independently of its legal regulation. When the criminal law defines 
murder, rape, assault, theft, criminal damage, and so on as crimes, it is not 
prohibiting the kinds of conduct that it defines as criminal, or making them 
wrong: it takes for granted that they are wrong, and declares them to be 
public wrongs.18 But the same is also true of so-called mala prohibita—
offenses consisting in conduct that is not or might not be wrongful 
independently of its legal prohibition. Here, it is true, we are dealing with 
legal prohibitions, but it is not, strictly speaking, the criminal law that does 
the prohibiting. What we have is, rather, a two-stage process of 
criminalization. A statute lays down a regulation proscribing or prescribing 
a type of conduct: for instance, regulations specifying speed limits that all 
drivers are to obey or requiring drivers to have driving licenses and to carry 
insurance. Assuming (as the law must) that such regulations have a 
legitimate claim on our obedience, we then do wrong if we break them; and 
the criminal law, in making it an offense to break the speed limit or to drive 
without a license or without insurance, declares the wrong to be a public 
wrong.19 The criminalized wrong is thus still a “preexisting wrong” in the 
sense that the conduct is wrongful prior to and independently of the 
criminal law, although it might not be wrongful independently of its legal 
regulation. Thus the criminal law functions not to create the wrong, but to 
declare its public character—and to provide an appropriate response to it.20 
Second, the criminal law gives effective force to such declarations of 
public wrongs by providing a criminal process of trial and punishment. To 
criminalize a type of conduct is thus not merely to declare that it is a public 
wrong; it is to make it the case that the conduct is liable to be treated as a 
public wrong, in that those who engage in it are liable to be called to public 
18 Although in declaring them to be public wrongs, the law must also provide relatively clear 
definitions that can be applied by the courts. This is likely to involve some divergence from our prelegal 
conceptions of the relevant wrongs—some degree of reconstruction, or more precise determination, or 
even stipulation.
19 This logical distinction between regulation and criminalization might not be reflected in the 
chronology or the substance of criminal legislation: that is, the same statute might both create the 
regulation and criminalize the breach of it. Nonetheless, the distinction is crucial to the logical (and 
normative) structure of the processes of criminalization; it is exhibited clearly when, as is quite often 
the case, a statute first creates or provides for the creation of a set of regulations governing some 
activity and then adds a provision making it an offense to break any of those regulations.
20 This is not to justify the vast and variegated range of mala prohibita that contemporary criminal 
laws contain; it is only to show how an account of criminal law dealing with public wrongs can make 
room for a category of mala prohibita. 
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account for it through a criminal trial and to be punished for it if convicted 
at trial. 
The significance of the criminal trial is often downplayed both in the 
practice of criminal law and in criminal law theory. In jurisdictions that 
operate pervasive practices of plea bargaining, there are very few contested 
trials;21 theorists often portray the trial—and the criminal process as a 
whole—in essentially instrumental terms, as a procedure that connects 
crime to punishment by identifying those who, having committed crimes, 
are liable to be punished. But we can build a rather different account of the 
proper aims of the criminal trial if we think more carefully about some 
central aspects of the structure and rhetoric of our existing institutions—for 
instance, about the importance attached to the defendant’s presence, to 
whether a defendant is “fit to plead” or “competent to stand trial,” to the 
entering of a plea of guilty or not guilty, to confrontation in court between 
the defendant and witnesses or accusers, and to the formality of the verdict.  
On this alternative account, the trial is understood as a process of 
calling to account or to answer—as a process through which the polity calls 
those accused of committing public wrongs to answer to their fellow 
citizens.22 More precisely, the defendant is called first to answer to the 
charge, which is done by pleading either guilty, thus admitting the culpable 
commission of a criminal wrong, or not guilty, thus challenging the 
prosecution to prove its case. The importance of the plea is shown in part 
by the significance of a refusal to plead: a defendant who rejects the 
authority of the court, or of the law under which she is tried, can display 
that rejection in a refusal to enter a plea, or to play any part in the trial. If 
the prosecution proves that the defendant committed the offense charged 
(or the defendant admits its commission), the defendant is called to answer 
for that offense: this can be done either by offering a defense, which seeks 
to justify or to excuse the commission of the offense, or by accepting one’s 
guilt. The formal verdict then either condemns the defendant’s conduct as a 
criminal wrong, thus holding the defendant to public account for that 
wrong; or declares that the defendant’s guilt has not been proved, so that 
the presumption of innocence, to which all citizens are entitled, remains 
undefeated. In thus answering before the court to the charge and for her 
conduct, the defendant is answering to her fellow citizens in whose name 
21 See, e.g., MARK MOTIVANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2011 – STATISTICAL TABLES 17 (2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
fjs11st.pdf [https://perma.cc/55UF-M4E5] (showing 97% of federal criminal convictions to be the result 
of guilty pleas, and thus typically of plea bargains).
22 For a detailed development of this account, see ANTONY DUFF, LINDSAY FARMER, SANDRA 
MARSHALL & VICTOR TADROS, THE TRIAL ON TRIAL: VOLUME 3: TOWARDS A NORMATIVE THEORY 
OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL (2007).
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the court acts—and in whose name the court then condemns her or acquits 
her. 
This enterprise of calling alleged criminal wrongdoers to formal 
public account can play an important, noninstrumental role in the polity’s 
civil order. It gives appropriate concrete form to the citizens’ collective 
commitment to the polity’s self-defining values, as they are expressed in 
the substantive criminal law, and to their recognition of each other as 
fellow members of the normative political community. For to be committed 
to a value is to be ready, inter alia, to respond appropriately to violations of 
it: to remain silent in the face of the violation would be to condone it. What 
makes it appropriate to respond by seeking to call the violator, the 
wrongdoer, to account is that in this way we do justice not only to the 
victim of the wrong (when there is an identifiable victim), but also to the 
wrongdoer as a responsible agent. If I have wronged you, other members of 
our community can display their recognition of that wrong, and thus offer 
you the kind of support you should be able to expect from them, by calling 
me to account for what I have done. But in doing so, they also display their 
recognition of me as a responsible member of that community; for to be a 
responsible agent is to be answerable for one’s conduct to those who have a 
proper interest in it—to fellow members of the relevant normative 
community. A system of criminal law and criminal trials is thus part of the 
polity’s civil order in the sense that it gives institutional form to the polity’s 
commitment to its shared public values and to its recognition of and 
concern for its members as responsible citizens. It also helps to sustain that 
civil order by providing for an appropriate response to kinds of conduct 
that violate it. 
It might seem that I have been ignoring the most significant feature of 
a system of criminal law—that it involves the infliction of punishment on 
those convicted of committing crimes. For, according to many theorists, 
both the substantive criminal law and the criminal process must be 
understood as preludes to criminal punishment.23 That is, we define crimes 
in the substantive criminal law, and maintain a criminal process through 
which we can identify those who commit those crimes, in order to provide 
for their punishment. The aims of that punishment might be retribution—
the imposition of a deserved quantum of suffering on wrongdoers24—or the 
prevention of kinds of conduct that cause harm or that disturb the 
conditions of social life by deterring or incapacitating those who might 
23 See, e.g., DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 78 
(2008); MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW ch. 1 (1997); 
Vincent Chiao, What Is the Criminal Law For?, 35 L. & PHIL. 137 (2016).
24 See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 23, at 33.
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engage in such conduct.25 But whatever the aims of criminal punishment, 
the most salient and normatively significant feature of criminal law is that 
it involves punishment. 
We need not engage here in the argument about whether punishment 
is a necessary or defining feature of criminal law—whether a system that 
defined “offenses” and provided a system of “trials” at which those accused 
of committing offenses were called to formal public account and 
condemned if proved guilty, but that imposed no further sanctions, should 
count as a system of “criminal law.”26 We need simply note that 
punishment is indeed a salient feature of our systems of criminal law, and 
that it is normatively problematic given the hardships that it imposes on 
those subjected to it. Any normative account of criminal law must therefore 
either offer an explanation of what kinds of punishment, serving what ends, 
a system of criminal law can properly provide for; or explain how criminal 
law is possible, how it can hope to achieve its justifying aims, without 
punishment. I will not try to offer such explanations here, but will 
emphasize two points. 
First, as this Part has already shown, the substantive criminal law and 
the criminal process each have independent significance that goes beyond 
their role as a prelude to criminal punishment. There is, I have argued, a 
value in the formal definition of public wrongs that the substantive criminal 
law provides—as a declaration of the kinds of wrong of which the polity 
will take formal note, and thus of the values that those wrongs violate. 
There is also a value in the formal process of calling alleged wrongdoers to 
public account through the criminal trial—as a suitable way of responding 
to the commission of public wrongs that shows respect for the values at 
stake, for the victims of those wrongs, and for their perpetrators. These 
values are independent of criminal punishment: they would subsist even if 
no further formal consequences followed from a criminal conviction.27 
Second, the challenge that criminal punishment presents to a 
republican account of the kind I have espoused here is to work out whether 
punishment (and what kinds of punishment) can play a role in an inclusive 
25 See, e.g., Chiao, supra note 23, at 138 (mentioning deterrence and incapacitation as two 
functions of the criminal law).
26 Cf. HUSAK, supra note 23, at 78 (positing that a “law simply is not criminal unless persons who 
break it become subject to state punishment”).
27 One objection might be that citizens would not take the criminal law or the criminal process 
seriously if they did not usually lead to the punishment of the guilty, in which case they would lose the 
value ascribed to them here. That might be true of systems in which punishment is regularly attached to 
crimes; it is not clear that it would also be true of systems that eschewed punishment from the start.
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polity of citizens who are to show each other “equal concern and respect.”28 
To put the point starkly, could criminal punishment be something that 
citizens impose on each other, and that they can undergo or undertake for 
themselves, without denying or negating their status as citizens? 
Punishment in our present systems is often exclusionary in both its impact 
and its meaning. Imprisonment, for example, treats and portrays those on 
whom it is imposed as something less than full citizens—as if in 
committing their crimes they have forfeited their civic standing.29 The 
question then is whether this is, normatively or practically, inevitable, or 
whether we can (re)imagine criminal punishment as a genuinely civic 
enterprise. Can we imagine a system of criminal law and punishment, one 
radically transformed from what we now have, in which we could plausibly 
say that convicted offenders have a civic duty not just to accept, but to 
undertake their punishment, as a debt that they owe as citizens to their 
fellow citizens? As far-fetched as it may seem from our current vantage 
point, I think that we can do this for at least some modes of punishment 
(although I cannot develop that argument here), in which case punishment 
can play a proper role in an inclusive republican system of criminal law.30 
Imprisonment, however, remains—and should remain—problematic as a 
mode of punishment. It is not clear that we can conceptualize imprisonment 
as being consistent with a recognition of those whom we imprison as full 
fellow citizens.31 
I have so far sketched an account of the role that criminal law can play 
in a liberal republic of equal, and mutually recognizing, citizens—a role 
that makes it a common law in the sense that it belongs to the citizens as an 
expression and implementation of their shared public values. We should 
now attend briefly to the ways in which the citizens of such a polity will 
relate to their criminal law. 
III. CITIZENS AND THEIR CRIMINAL LAW
Theoretical accounts of law in general, and of criminal law in 
particular, often portray it as something external to the citizens over whom 
28 See DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 190. On inclusionary rather than exclusionary community, see 
supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text.
29 This is a feature both of the practice and political rhetoric of criminal punishment in our existing 
systems, and of some normative theories of punishment. For extreme examples of the latter, see Alan H. 
Goldman, Toward a New Theory of Punishment, 1 L. & PHIL. 57 (1982); Christopher W. Morris, 
Punishment and Loss of Moral Standing, 21 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 53 (1991).
30 See R. A. Duff & S. E. Marshall, Civic Punishment, in DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND MASS
INCARCERATION 33 (Albert W. Dzur et al. eds., 2016).
31 See, e.g., Peter Ramsay, A Democratic Theory of Imprisonment, in DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND 
MASS INCARCERATION, supra note 30, at 84.
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it claims authority. H. L. A. Hart’s well-known account of the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for the existence of a legal system nicely 
illustrates this tendency. 
A legal system, according to Hart, involves a structure of “primary” 
and “secondary” rules.32 The primary rules are “rules of behaviour” that are 
supposed to guide the conduct of ordinary citizens. The secondary rules 
authorize and guide the conduct of the officials who make and apply the 
law: the “official creation, the official identification, and the official use 
and application of law.”33 A legal system exists, as law, only if those 
secondary rules are “effectively accepted as common public standards of 
official behaviour by [the] officials.”34 As far as the primary rules are 
concerned, however, it is only necessary that they are “generally obeyed” 
by the citizens whose conduct they are to guide—they need not be 
“accepted” as standards of conduct.35 A system that satisfied only these 
“minimum” necessary and sufficient conditions would not, Hart allows, be 
a “healthy” system36: it “might be deplorably sheeplike.”37 For a “healthy 
society,” something more is needed: that the private citizens generally 
“accept these [primary] rules as common standards of behaviour and 
acknowledge an obligation to obey them.”38  
What matters about this account for our present purposes is not the 
difference between a healthy and a sheeplike system, but the fact that even 
in a healthy system the law is in an important sense external to the citizens. 
It is made, interpreted, applied, and enforced by the “officials”; the lay 
citizens’ role is simply to obey the primary rules that the officials create for 
them and impose on them—or, of course, to disobey those rules and risk 
suffering the punitive consequences of doing so. Their obedience might, if 
it is nothing more, reflect only a prudent fear of the law’s power; or it 
might, in a healthy society, reflect a respect for the law’s authority. But in 
either case it is an obedience to law that is made for them and imposed on 
them. 
Now this model of law might often be descriptively accurate. In many 
societies, including our own, many people might see the criminal law as an 
institutional structure that is external or alien to them, that demands their 
obedience and that enforces those demands by the threat of punitive 
32 H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 114 (3d ed. 2012). 
33 Id. at 113. 
34 Id. at 116. 
35 Id. at 112, 114.
36 Id. at 116. 
37 Id. at 117 
38 Id. at 116.
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sanctions. But it is not a normatively attractive picture of how criminal law 
should figure in the life of a liberal democratic republic as I have sketched 
it, or in the lives of its citizens. Nor do we provide a normatively 
satisfactory picture simply by adding to the Hartian picture the kind of 
democratic dimension that characterizes representative versions of 
democracy—by requiring that the officials who make and administer the 
law be accountable to the citizens over whom they claim authority, whether 
by elections or by other possible modes of accountability. Much of the 
work of lawmaking and law-applying must, for a variety of familiar 
reasons (competence, efficiency, predictability, the rule of law, etc.) be 
performed by duly appointed and professionally qualified officials. But, 
especially in the context of criminal law, it is important that lay citizens 
also have active roles to play in the law’s enterprise—and be willing to 
play those roles. 
This is important partly as an implication of the republican idea of 
self-governance: if we are to be or become a self-governing polity of 
citizens, we must be able and willing to play an active role in the enterprise 
of governance, which is to say that our democracy should be participatory 
rather than merely representative.39 It is of particular importance in relation 
to the criminal law, because on the conception I have sketched here, the 
criminal law speaks in our collective voice of the values that structure our 
polity. It defines what we collectively count as public wrongs, and calls 
those who perpetrate such wrongs to answer to us as their fellow citizens. 
We should therefore all be ready and able to play an active part in that 
collective enterprise; we should see ourselves as agents, not merely as 
obedient subjects, of the criminal law. This is not to suggest, as critics 
might fear, that we should be ready to collaborate actively in unjust or 
oppressive practices of criminal law. For, first, we can have such a civic 
duty to collaborate only with a tolerably just system of law, in a tolerably 
just society.40 Second, although in such a society we should indeed respect, 
and be ready to help to enact, the law as our law, that respect must be 
critical rather than merely deferential. We must be ready, that is, to 
interrogate the law, to use discretion in applying it—and if need be to 
disobey it if its requirements are unjust.41 
39 For a useful discussion of participatory democracy and some of its implications for the criminal 
process, see ALBERT W. DZUR, PUNISHMENT, PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY, AND THE JURY (2012).
40 This of course raises a host of questions about what makes for a “tolerably just” society or 
system of law—questions on which we cannot embark here. 
41 Cf. William A. Edmundson, The Virtue of Law-Abidance, 6 PHILOSOPHERS’ IMPRINT 1 (2006)
(discussing the difference between “abidance” and “obedience”). 
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If republican citizens are to be agents of their criminal law, we must 
ask what forms that agency should take. We can answer this question, and 
thus develop a fuller picture of the role of the criminal law in a democratic 
republic, by attending to the various roles that lay citizens might play in 
relation to the criminal law. Roles are structured sets of rights and 
responsibilities: they constitute particular modes of participation in 
institutions or practices, and are defined in terms of their contribution to the 
relevant institution or practice. Thus we can, for example, define such roles 
as doctor, nurse, and patient within the practice of medicine; of professor, 
student, and administrator within the practice of university education. In 
each case we define the role’s rights and responsibilities by reference to the 
proper aims of the practice. 
In the practice of criminal law, many of the roles are professional 
roles, to be filled by agents who are supposed to bring appropriate expertise 
to them: these include such roles as legislator, police officer, prosecutor, 
defense attorney, judge, and correctional officer. There is much to be said 
about how people should acquire such roles (whether, for instance, by 
appointment or by election) and about just what their rights and 
responsibilities should be,42 but we should also attend to the various roles 
that lay citizens can play. One set of questions concerns the role they 
should play in the initial enactment of criminal laws—in legislation. 
Another set of questions concerns the kinds of role they can play as 
authoritative agents of the criminal law—for instance, as jurors or as lay 
judges. A third set of questions concerns the roles that we may find 
ourselves playing (voluntarily or not) in relation to particular crimes: these 
include such roles as witness, victim, and perpetrator; suspect and 
defendant; and convicted offender. It is, on the conception of a republican 
polity and its criminal law advocated here, important to see all of these as 
civic roles: as, that is, roles that citizens can be called on to play (or can 
take on), each of which involves a distinctive set of rights and 
responsibilities, and each of which makes a distinct contribution to the 
enterprise of the criminal law. 
We cannot embark on the discussion of these roles here.43 However, a 
detailed normative study of them, a study that asks both what criminal law 
roles should be recognized in a republican polity and how the rights and 
responsibilities of those roles should be defined, would help to give more 
concrete shape to this conception of criminal law—a conception of 
42 See generally Kimberley Brownlee, Responsibilities of Criminal Justice Officials, 27 J. APPLIED
PHIL. 123 (2010).
43 But see Duff & Marshall, supra note 30.
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criminal law that can truly be seen as the common law of the citizens of 
such a polity. That, however, is a task for another occasion. 
CONCLUSION 
The criminal law of a liberal republic (a democratic polity of free and 
equal citizens) will, I have argued, have two central purposes: to define a 
set of public wrongs—wrongs that properly concern the whole polity— and 
to provide an appropriate formal response to such wrongs through a 
criminal process in which alleged perpetrators are called to answer to their 
fellow citizens. It will also provide punishments for those convicted of 
criminal wrongdoing, but in punishing offenders it will still treat them 
inclusively, as full members of the polity who are entitled to the equal 
concern and respect of their fellows. The citizens of such a polity will be 
able to see such a criminal law as their law: as a law that reflects the civic 
values that they share or aspire to share and helps to secure the civil order 
in which they live together; as a law in whose enterprise they can play an 
active part. 
As I made clear at the start of this Essay, and as should have been 
clear throughout it, this is not offered as either a description or a justifying 
theory of our existing systems of criminal law; it is offered as an ideal—
one that I hope we will find persuasive. As an ideal, it provides us with a 
standard by which to judge, and criticize, our existing legal and political 
institutions, as well as a (distant) goal towards which we can aspire and 
work. It is certainly a distant ideal. Indeed, the distance from here to there 
is so great that it might seem more like a philosophical fantasy than a 
practicable goal towards which we could realistically strive. But efforts at 
reform, whether legal, social, or political, need a goal; and although the 
immediate goals of practical efforts at reform will need to be relatively 
modest if they are to be feasible, we need to begin with some idea of the 
final end or aim of our endeavors. That is why ideal theory, of the kind in 
which this Essay has engaged, has an important role to play. 
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